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Background: Grenon and Smith (2004) propose a frame-
work for the ontology of things in space and time involving 
and invoking the distinction between continuants and oc-
currents, which has become a key element of Basic Formal 
Ontology (BFO). The terminology of SNAP (from “snap-
shot:” state of a continuant at a time) and SPAN (how an oc-
current develops over an interval or timespan) occurs in that 
paper’s title. While any commonsense ontology will have a 
place for both continuants and occurrents, there is much 
room for philosophical debate on whether one of them is 
more basic than the other, or can be reduced to the other, or 
whether they are equally fundamental, or whether they are 
two different perspectives on the same reality. Grenon and 
Smith opt for the last of these. They call the accounts of con-
tinuants (SNAP) and occurrents (SPAN) both “ontologies.” 
They do not have a single ontology of all that is in space and 
time. This dialog throws a few of the common arguments 
around a bit and comes to no sure conclusion. But one of the 
characters bears a faint resemblance to a certain Buffalonian 
philosopher. 
Abstract, Grenon and Smith (2004): We propose a modular 
ontology of the dynamic features of reality. This amounts, on 
the one hand, to a purely spatial ontology supporting snap-
shot views of the world at successive instants of time and, 
on the other hand, to a purely spatiotemporal ontology of 
change and process. We argue that dynamic spatial ontology 
must combine these two distinct types of inventory of the 
entities and relationships in reality, and we provide charac-
terizations of spatiotemporal reasoning in the light of the in-
terconnections between them. 
[Time: the present. Scene: A Philosophy Department 
Common Room. Four ontologists are discussing change. 
Three-Dimensionalist (3D) and Four-Dimensionalist (4D) 
are disputing, the two others are listening.]
3D [in tweed jacket with leather elbow patches, cord trou-
sers, brown Oxford brogues, checked shirt with striped 
school tie, with chalk-stained fingers, is speaking donnishly 
at the blackboard]: ... so you see I do not need your events at 
all. An event is merely a succession of changes to a substance, 
or what you call a “continuant” (sniffs). Let C be any chang-
ing “continuant,” such as this piece of chalk, a gyrocompass, 
or a chameleon. Now as Aristotle says in the Physics ...
[4D (in shorts and T-shirt with baseball cap and trainers) 
can contain himself no longer. Throwing down the copy of 
Scientific American that he had been browsing, he jumps up 
and excitedly runs through Lewis’s “temporary intrinsics” 
argument from On the Plurality of Worlds, (Lewis 1986, pp. 
202–205) to the effect that because of the threatening incon-
sistencies in the notion of change, it is best to take C to have 
temporal parts, i.e. be an occurrent. 3D sighs: he has heard it 
all so many times before.]
TROUBLE UP AT T’ONTOLOGICAL MILL: AN INCONCLUSIVE DIALOG A WHIMSICAL POSTSCRIPT IN ONTOLOGICAL FOLkLORE
63
COSMOS + TAXIS
CO
SM
O
S 
+ 
TA
X
IS
 
[At this point a third and smartly dressed ontologist springs 
to 3D’s defence with a “May I?” With deft and practiced 
movements, he sweeps chalk dust from the table, places 
his elegant and state-of-the-art laptop on the clean space, 
plugs it into the projector, pulls a white screen down in 
front of the dusty blackboard and starts to click through a 
large PowerPoint file to reach a slide. He is: SNAP–SPAN 
Metaontologist.]
SSM: I can avoid the inconsistencies by distinguishing be-
tween SPAN, which looks at occurrents over time, and 
SNAP, which is a series of snapshots (instantaneous states) of 
continuants at different times (shows several slides in quick 
succession to emphasize his point).
4D (languidly): I can show using your instantaneous states 
that C has temporal parts after all.
SSM (surprised): How?
4D: I just sum all the instantaneous states together.
SSM: But you can’t do that.
4D: Why not? I just did.
SSM: But it’s inconsistent. If C changes, then its properties at 
one time are contrary to those at another. What you get by 
summing states is not C but C’s life. That’s not a continuant, 
it’s an occurrent.
4D: Precisely. C and C’s life are one and the same.
SSM: But you can’t say that. It goes against common sense. 
It’s nonsense.
4D (sarcastically): I don’t recognize Oxford ordinary lan-
guage prohibitions. I am a scientist.
SSM (determinedly): Here’s an argument. C’s life, being an 
occurrent, has all its parts essentially. So, if C is C’s life, C 
could not have existed for a longer or shorter time than it 
did. But C obviously could have ceased to exist earlier or 
later than it did. So, there is a modal difference between C 
and C’s life, which means they are essentially distinct. Even if 
a continuant exists only for an instant, it could have existed 
for longer, but an instantaneous occurrent has to be instanta-
neous. So, no continuant can be an occurrent.
[At the word “essentially,” 3D, who had been disconsolately 
fingering his well-used copy of Liddell and Scott’s A Greek–
English Lexicon, brightens up for a moment, only to lapse 
into despond again at the word “occurrent.”]
4D (briskly): I don’t accept your modal distinction. For me 
what you call C’s life could have been longer or shorter. I see 
no need for the distinction. All objects in time are occur-
rents.
SSM (persistently): But we cannot identify and recognize oc-
currents except by identifying and recognizing continuants 
(Strawson 1959).
4D (sneeringly): That’s epistemology. I am an ontologist. 
Anyway, Strawson may be wrong (Moravcsik 1970).
SSM (recovering): I agree that we need occurrents in our on-
tology. But like Wiggins (2001), and unlike you, or 3D, I am 
a continuant–occurrent dualist.
4D: By your own admission you have instantaneous states in 
SNAP, and I have just shown you how to sum these mereo-
logically to give temporally extended things, which are in 
SPAN. So, you are hoisted by your own petard. Admit it, 
your dualism is unnecessary and by Ockham’s Razor contin-
uants should be discarded in a modern scientific ontology.
[3D groans quietly]
SSM: Let me clarify what I mean. By “instantaneous states” I 
don’t mean entities in the world, but momentary snapshots, 
consistent representations of what there is at an instant.
4D (incredulously): You mean you don’t take them ontologi-
cally seriously after all?
SSM: Yes, but not as entities.
4D (with heavy irony): Oh I’m sorry, I thought we were do-
ing ontology. I didn’t quite catch the silent quotation marks. 
That’s what linguists do all the time isn’t it? They confuse en-
tities with representations. I thought you were against that.
SSM (huffily): I am. Vehemently. Medical Informatics is rife 
with it, but I’m putting them right. What I mean is that be-
cause of change you cannot put different SNAP ontologies 
together consistently. You need a multiplicity of SNAP on-
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tologies, one for each different time, and a SPAN ontology 
for occurrents.
4D: Why can’t you put different ontologies together to get a 
bigger and more adequate one?
SSM: Because by an “ontology” I mean a consistent theory of 
things all of which can be mereologically summed.
4D (puzzled): And why can’t I put different SNAP ontologies 
together?
SSM: Because then you would have inconsistencies.
4D (more puzzled): Why? Why can’t I merge SNAP ontolo-
gies just as easily as I summed instantaneous states (before I 
understood you — er — correctly)?
SSM (triumphantly): Because then either you’d have a SPAN 
ontology, which fails to recognize continuants, or you’d have 
continuants which have incompatible properties. A single 
ontology cannot encompass both continuants and occur-
rents, and remember, no continuant can be an occurrent.
[4D lapses into head-shaking silence. At this point the fourth 
ontologist, who has kept silent until now, clears her throat. 
She is wearing elegant jeggings and top from a Milan fash-
ion house. Her laptop is metallic pink. She is agnostic about 
3D/4D but believes that ontology forms a single unified dis-
cipline or field. She is: Unified Field Ontologist.]
UFO (to SSM): So are you saying there is no such thing as 
ontology, Aristotle and Wolff ’s science of being qua being?
SSM: Yes. I used to think there was, but Medical Informatics 
changed my mind. Since an ontology concerns only things 
which can be summed mereologically, and not all things can 
be summed mereologically, there is not one ontology but 
many.
UFO: What’s wrong with the mereological sum principle, 
that any two or more entities have a mereological sum?
SSM (amusedly): Would we really say there is a single object 
consisting of the number 9, the color blue, my computer and 
the first five minutes of this year’s UEFA Cup Final? We don’t 
talk like that.
UFO (flashingly and without a trace of sarcasm): I don’t rec-
ognize Oxford ordinary language prohibitions. I am a scien-
tist.
SSM (coaxingly): Come on, you have to admit such mon-
strous (Fine 1999) transcategorial sums are absurd.
UFO (defiantly): Go ahead, make my day. Show me the con-
tradiction.
SSM: Erm … well you have to admit they are pretty bizarre 
and weird.
UFO: I don’t deny that, but so are lots of things. Anyway, 
even if I admit that there are no transcategorial sums, why 
does that mean we cannot have a single ontology?
SSM: Because by an “ontology” I mean a consistent theory of 
things all of which can be mereologically summed.
UFO: Oh yes, so you said. But there’s a lot more to ontology 
than mereology. For instance, if John kisses Mary there are 
John and Mary, both of whom are continuants, and the kiss, 
which is an occurrent. They may not (pace Lewis, Armstrong 
and others) be parts of a single mereological whole, but you 
have to admit they are connected.
SSM (smugly): Oh yes, I do. Entities in all my different on-
tologies are linked by relations. The theory of these linking 
relations is what I call “metaontology.”
UFO (puzzled herself): But surely the relations in your met-
aontology are in the world?
SSM (decisively): Yes of course. I am a realist. Well, except 
that some of the relations are internal, but let’s not worry 
about that.
UFO: So why is the whole consisting of all your ontologies 
together with metaontology not Aristotle and Wolff ’s sci-
ence of being?
SSM: Because the whole is inconsistent.
UFO: Not if you do the job properly.
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SSM (firmly): By keeping ontologies confined to consis-
tent maximal mereological ones, I rescue as much of that 
doomed project as is possible.
UFO: Why privilege mereology?
SSM: Because it’s central to ontology.
UFO (pensively): I don’t disagree there. But let’s see, you pre-
sumably think that identity is at least as fundamental to on-
tology as mereological relations are?
SSM (suspiciously): Yeees — go on.
UFO: Well suppose I confine an ontology to all that can con-
sistently be said of all the things that can be glued together 
using the identity relation. Then I’d have as many ontologies 
as entities (smiles cheerfully).
SSM (outraged): But then you couldn’t even say in one ontol-
ogy that a is not identical to b, or that a is a proper part of b! 
That would be intolerable!
UFO: I could deal with all the linking relations between dis-
tinct existences in my metaontology, which would contain 
all yours does and more still, to cope with difference and 
mereology.
SSM: That would be ridiculous.
UFO: It’s no different in principle from what you do.
SSM (trying another tack): But anyway, identity isn’t a real 
relation. Your ontologies would contain only such trivialities 
as that a = a and that a exists. All or nearly all the interesting 
parts would be relegated to the metaontology.
UFO: The same as in your case. Only once all the fun is in 
the metaontology I can forget the silly ontologies and just 
rename the whole thing “ontology,” and I get what I want.
SSM: But at least my ontologies are consistent. Your metaon-
tology would not be.
UFO: Why not?
SSM: Because you can’t put all the ontologies (including the 
mereologies) together consistently.
UFO: You can if you do the job properly.
SSM: You said that before. Let’s not repeat ourselves. What 
do you mean by doing the job properly?
UFO: You admit that each of your ontologies is consistent.
SSM: Of course. It’s designed to be.
UFO: So a consistent ontology is one that could be com-
pletely true?
SSM: Yes of course.
UFO: So all the ontologies could be true together.
SSM (condescendingly): Just because some judgments are 
consistent and some other judgments are consistent doesn’t 
mean the whole lot are consistent. Take any contingent judg-
ment, say that p. Each of p and its negation not-p is consis-
tent but the pair {p, not-p} is not. In ontology it’s much more 
complicated but the principle is the same.
UFO (doggedly): Suppose one of your ontologies O1 is not 
just consistent but actually true.
SSM: All right.
UFO: And another one O2 is also true.
SSM: Yes. That could happen.
UFO: Then O1 + O2 is also true, so it is consistent.
SSM: I’ll grant you it works in that simple case, but in the 
full-blown case ...
UFO (smoothly): If you do the job properly, each of the on-
tologies is true, as is the metaontology, so the whole consist-
ing of all of them is true. So the whole is true, and therefore 
consistent. That’s what I mean by doing the job properly.
SSM: But look, it just can’t be done. I used to think like you, 
but Medical Informatics has convinced me it cannot.
UFO: Surely you aren’t suggesting that truth be relativized to 
a time, or an ontology, or a view, or in some other way.
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SSM (stiffly): Of course not. Truth is absolute. It’s just that 
some of the things traditional ontologists thought could be 
done cannot be done without getting into contradictions ...
3D (perking up, sotto voce in UFO’s left ear): You could call 
them “antinomies of pure reason.”
SSM: ... so we have to pull our horns in and be more modest.
4D (catching on, sotto voce in UFO’s right ear): You could 
call it “metaphysics within the bounds of sense.”
SSM (noticing the whispering): What?
UFO (brightly): So — you are a follower of Kant then?
SSM (affecting not to hear the name): Who? Anyway, it’s get-
ting late. Anyone fancy a glass of wine?
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